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"Inspector finds rampant waste
War is expensive, and no one wants to risk American lives by fighting on the cheap. But in Afghanistan, the U.S. government's open checkbook has too often produced the sort of wasteful spending that can undermine public support for the war.
In the nearly 12-year-long fight, American taxpayers have spent nearly $93 billion on "reconstruction," which includes everything from building schools to equipping the Afghan military and securing the government. That's about the same amount the U.S. government is spending this year on domestic highways, airports and other transportation projects.
How much of the Afghan spending has been wasted is unknown, but examples uncovered by John Sopko, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, suggest that the amounts are substantial.
Some would be comical if they weren't so infuriating:
*The Defense Department built a 64,000-square-foot, $34 million headquarters building in southwestern Afghanistan, even though a Marine commander said he didn't want or need it. The building has never been occupied and will likely be torn down without ever being used.
*The Pentagon is spending more than $770 million to buy 18 Swiss turboprop planes and 30 Russian helicopters for Afghanistan's counternarcotics and counterterrorism air wing, despite a shortage of Afghan pilots capable of flying the aircraft and mechanics who can maintain them.
*The Defense Department spent $11.5 million to build four incinerators for solid waste at a key U.S. military base. Sopko found that the two largest incinerators were not being used; instead, solid waste was being burned in an open pit, worsening the already bad air quality at the base.
*U.S. officials hired an Afghan contractor so inept that the courthouse he built was unusable. The same contractor is bidding to, yes, tear the building down.
Other examples of mismanagement are anything but amusing:
*The Pentagon hired Afghan contractors to install "culvert-denial systems" to stop the Taliban from planting explosive devices inside the culverts underneath roadways where U.S. troops travel. But contract officers rarely bothered to check on the work. The Afghan contractors often installed the grates incorrectly or not at all, contributing to the deaths of least two U.S. soldiers.
*Despite repeated complaints, American contracts and money are going to about 60 Afghan contractors with ties to al-Qaeda or the Taliban, which means U.S. taxpayers could be helping to fund the enemy.
The Pentagon agrees with some of Sopko's findings but disputes others. Officials say the unneeded building, for example, represented $13 million of a $34 million contract. There's a plan to train pilots and mechanics for the helicopters and turboprops. The officials say they take oversight seriously and work hard at it.
If so, there's room for improvement. Afghanistan is unquestionably a tough place to operate — with a harsh security environment and often unreliable allies. But that's no excuse for serial breakdowns in basic planning, oversight and accountability. Who, for example, signed off on that unused building? The Defense Department can't say.
Congress has a role here, too, of course, because the appropriators provide the money in the first place, often in such great gobs that it seems no politician wants to be accused of having lost the war by giving the Pentagon too little.
Americans might think this will all be moot when U.S. troops leave Afghanistan next year, but not so fast: The spending in Afghanistan is set to go on long after the troops come home. If Pentagon officials expect continued backing for such spending, they'll have to do a better job of keeping it from going down a rat hole."
http://ebird.osd.mil/ebird2/ebfiles/e20130722927348.html
War is expensive, and no one wants to risk American lives by fighting on the cheap. But in Afghanistan, the U.S. government's open checkbook has too often produced the sort of wasteful spending that can undermine public support for the war.
In the nearly 12-year-long fight, American taxpayers have spent nearly $93 billion on "reconstruction," which includes everything from building schools to equipping the Afghan military and securing the government. That's about the same amount the U.S. government is spending this year on domestic highways, airports and other transportation projects.
How much of the Afghan spending has been wasted is unknown, but examples uncovered by John Sopko, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, suggest that the amounts are substantial.
Some would be comical if they weren't so infuriating:
*The Defense Department built a 64,000-square-foot, $34 million headquarters building in southwestern Afghanistan, even though a Marine commander said he didn't want or need it. The building has never been occupied and will likely be torn down without ever being used.
*The Pentagon is spending more than $770 million to buy 18 Swiss turboprop planes and 30 Russian helicopters for Afghanistan's counternarcotics and counterterrorism air wing, despite a shortage of Afghan pilots capable of flying the aircraft and mechanics who can maintain them.
*The Defense Department spent $11.5 million to build four incinerators for solid waste at a key U.S. military base. Sopko found that the two largest incinerators were not being used; instead, solid waste was being burned in an open pit, worsening the already bad air quality at the base.
*U.S. officials hired an Afghan contractor so inept that the courthouse he built was unusable. The same contractor is bidding to, yes, tear the building down.
Other examples of mismanagement are anything but amusing:
*The Pentagon hired Afghan contractors to install "culvert-denial systems" to stop the Taliban from planting explosive devices inside the culverts underneath roadways where U.S. troops travel. But contract officers rarely bothered to check on the work. The Afghan contractors often installed the grates incorrectly or not at all, contributing to the deaths of least two U.S. soldiers.
*Despite repeated complaints, American contracts and money are going to about 60 Afghan contractors with ties to al-Qaeda or the Taliban, which means U.S. taxpayers could be helping to fund the enemy.
The Pentagon agrees with some of Sopko's findings but disputes others. Officials say the unneeded building, for example, represented $13 million of a $34 million contract. There's a plan to train pilots and mechanics for the helicopters and turboprops. The officials say they take oversight seriously and work hard at it.
If so, there's room for improvement. Afghanistan is unquestionably a tough place to operate — with a harsh security environment and often unreliable allies. But that's no excuse for serial breakdowns in basic planning, oversight and accountability. Who, for example, signed off on that unused building? The Defense Department can't say.
Congress has a role here, too, of course, because the appropriators provide the money in the first place, often in such great gobs that it seems no politician wants to be accused of having lost the war by giving the Pentagon too little.
Americans might think this will all be moot when U.S. troops leave Afghanistan next year, but not so fast: The spending in Afghanistan is set to go on long after the troops come home. If Pentagon officials expect continued backing for such spending, they'll have to do a better job of keeping it from going down a rat hole."
http://ebird.osd.mil/ebird2/ebfiles/e20130722927348.html
